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Executive Summary 
Haiti is the most impoverished country in the Western Hemisphere, with 76 percent of its 
population below the poverty line and a life expectancy of 58.1 years.
1 Yet it was originally 
excluded from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank’s Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt cancellation in 1996, because of a technicality 
relating to its debt service burden. 
 
Although it was subsequently included (in 2006), because of this delay Haiti is currently 
struggling to meet the requirements for cancellation of most of its total $1.7 billion foreign 
public debt. Thus, while the other HIPC countries in the Western Hemisphere (Bolivia, 
Guyana, Honduras, and Nicaragua) have already received debt cancellation under the HIPC 
and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) – Haiti still has to reach the "completion 
point" under the HIPC initiative in order to receive debt cancellation. 
 
Haiti was expected to reach completion point by September 2008.  However, this did not 
happen and now the country has to pay an additional $44.5 million in debt service payments 
to multilateral institutions (mostly the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank). This is equivalent to about 26 percent of Haiti's spending on public health, where 
there are many vital unmet needs. Furthermore, this total does not include bilateral debt 
service of $11.4 million, some cancellation of which was also expected.  The IDB might 
cover a portion of Haiti’s debt service payments to that institution, at least for the first half 
of 2009, since Haiti is now expected to reach completion point by this date.  
 
There are other reasons to avoid delay. There is little reason to believe that the conditions set 
by  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  for  further  debt  cancellation  are  likely  to  benefit  Haiti. 
Although the experience of HIPC debt cancellation is positive with regard to the funds freed 
up from debt cancellation being used for poverty-reducing expenditures,
2 the conditions 
attached to such debt cancellation do not have a positive track record. For example, in April 
2007,  the  IMF's  Independent  Evaluation  Office  released  a  report  that  examined  the 
experience  of  29  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  that  underwent  Poverty  Reduction  and 
Growth Facility (PRGF) programs, and were therefore subject to IMF conditions, from 
1999-2005. The report was highly critical of the IMF's role, and among other findings noted 
that nearly three-quarters of the aid money reaching these countries was not spent. Rather, at 
the IMF's urging, this money was used to pay off debt and to add to reserves.
3 
 
Another reason that these institutions should grant immediate debt cancellation is that they 
contributed to enormous economic damage in Haiti by cutting off all disbursements from 
2001 – 2004. There is considerable evidence that this cutoff of aid was part of a deliberate 
effort by the U.S. government to destabilize and ultimately topple the elected government of 
                                                 
1 See IMF (2008a), “Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, IMF Country Report No. 08/115.  Available 
online at: [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08115.pdf]. 
2 See IDA/IMF (2007), "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) – Status of Implementation" August 28,2007 
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/082807.pdf].   
3 See Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2007), “The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.” Online at: 




4 As noted by economist Jeffrey Sachs, a former advisor to the IMF and World Bank, 
“U.S. officials surely knew that the aid embargo would mean a balance-of-payments crisis, a 




For a country as poor as Haiti, the aid embargo was enormously destructive to the economy, 
and the violence during and after the coup inflicted further damage and cost thousands of 
lives. Because of the multilateral creditors' participation in this destruction, and for the other 
reasons noted in this paper, Haiti's debt should be canceled without further delay. 
                                                 
4 Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. “RFK Memorial Takes Treasury Department to 
Court to Determine US Role in Denying Loans Vital to Haiti’s Perilous Public Health.” Press Release, August 
15, 2006. [http://www.rfkmemorial.org/legacyinaction/2002_TreasCompl/]. See Walt Bogdanich and Jenny 
Nordberg, “Mixed U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos.” The New York Times, January 29, 2006, for 
background on the U.S. role in the coup.  
5 Jeffrey Sachs, “From His First Day in Office, Bush Was Ousting Aristide,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2004 Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 4 
Introduction 
Haiti is currently struggling to meet the conditions set forth by the International Monetary 
Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank  in  order  to  qualify  for  debt  relief  under  the  Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Once the country meets these conditions, it will 
receive additional debt relief under the latest Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).   
 
In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) also agreed to cancel most of the 
outstanding loans of the five poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Haiti.  
Even though the IDB did not take part in the MDRI, it has linked the full delivery of its 
promised debt relief to Haiti to the same conditions set forth by the IMF and the World 
Bank under the HIPC Initiative.  
 
The HIPC Initiative began eleven years ago, but at the time, Haiti was excluded from it 
because it did not meet the technical debt burden indicators, which were later revised in 
1999, and in spite of being the most impoverished country in the Western Hemisphere.  
Today,  social  indicators  in  Haiti  remain  at  terribly  low  levels:  some  76  percent  of  its 
population living in poverty, a life expectancy of 58.1 years, an illiteracy rate of 58.7 percent 
and 47 percent of the population without access to safe drinking water.
6  
 
For  these  reasons  and  others  described  below,  it  would  make  sense  to  grant  debt 
cancellation  to  Haiti  immediately,  rather  than  forcing  the  government  to  meet  various 
macroeconomic performance criteria before receiving the promised debt cancellation. 
 
 
Current debt situation 
According  to  the  most  recent  data  from  Haiti’s  Economy  and  Finance  Ministry,  the 
country’s total foreign public debt reached $1.7
7 billion in May 2008.
8  
 
Most  of  Haiti’s  foreign  public  debt  is  owed  to  the  World  Bank  (more  specifically,  the 
International Development Association, IDA) and the IDB, as shown in Table 1 below.  
These debts together currently represent around 18 percent of Haiti’s GDP and account for 
76.3 percent of the country’s total foreign public debt.  
 
After  reaching  decision  point  status  in  November  2006,  Haiti  was  supposed  to  receive 
interim debt relief under the HIPC Initiative from both multilateral and bilateral creditors 
for the FY2007-2008 period. It was assumed that Haiti would reach completion point by 
September 2008, after which it would receive full debt relief.  The interim debt relief had 
been estimated at $19.8 million in debt service reduction ($13.3 million in FY2007 and $6.5 
million in FY2008).
9 As a result of this interim debt relief, Haiti’s debt service payments 
                                                 
6 See IMF (2008a), “Haiti: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper”, IMF Country Report No. 08/115. 
7 All dollar amounts used here refer to the US dollar. 
8 Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances de la Republique d’Haïti (MEF), “Dette externe du secteur public (Mai 08)”: 
[http://www.mefhaiti.gouv.ht/download.php?dwn=Dettemai%2008.xls]. 
9 IDA/IMF 2006, Decision Point Document, p. 22. Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 5 
 
 
would be reduced by 15 percent to $76.3 million in FY2007 and by 11 percent to $54.5 
million in FY2008.  
 
TABLE 1 
Haiti: Stock of External Public Debt /1 (Fiscal Year ending September 30) 
   2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  As of 
May 2008 
  (In millions of US$) 
Total  1,216.1  1,304.4  1,359.2  1,365.2  1,463.2  1,541.3  1,713.7 
               
Medium and long-term debt  1,166.9  1,245.7  1,280.5  1,329.8  1,418.5  1,541.2  1,713.6 
Bilateral creditors /2  180.3  202.2  211.5  234.4  244.0  234.6  292.6 
United States  9.4  8.7  8.0  15.1  14.4  13.8  13.4 
France  43.3  50.9  56.4  64.1  68.1  75.3  85.2 
Others  127.6  142.6  147.2  155.2  161.5  145.5  194.0 
Multilateral creditors  956.6  1,026.0  1,057.8  1,073.6  1,142.1  1,306.6  1,421.0 
IBRD/IDA  495.5  528.4  540.5  504.2  512.2  528.4  538.2 
IFAD  25.6  28.8  30.9  31.7  33.2  37.4  40.1 
IDB  430.3  462.7  481.4  534.0  593.5  682.1  769.1 
OPEC special fund  5.2  6.1  5.0  3.7  3.2  3.1  3.4 
IMF and IMF trust fund  30.0  17.5  11.2  21.8  32.4  55.6  70.2 
               
Other debt /3  49.2  58.6  78.7  35.4  44.7  0.1  0.1 
Short term  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Arrears  49.2  58.6  78.7  35.4  44.7  0.1  0.1 
               
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars) /4  3,472.2  2,960.3  3,537.7  4,310.3  4,836.3  6,618.4  7,259.3 
Nominal GDP (millions of Gourdes) /4  94,028.0 119,758.0  140,387.0 168,034.0  200,456.0 247,529.0  273,964 
Source: IMF (2007b)
10; Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances de la Republique d’Haïti (MEF); Banque de 
la République d’Haïti (BRH). 
Notes: 
1/ Includes concessional and commercial public debt, officially guaranteed debt, and central bank 
liabilities, including use of Fund resources. 
2/ Includes rescheduled debt with Canada, France, Spain and the United States. 
3/ Excludes overdue suppliers’ credits in dispute (“dette en litige”). 
4/ Nominal GDP figures in Gourdes from 2002-2007 are from Haiti's Central Bank (BRH) and converted 
to US dollars using average reference exchange rates (from BRH). Figures for 2008 are mid-point 
projections based on average nominal GDP growth rate for 2002-2007 period. 
 
In 2007, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which holds the largest share of 
Haiti’s total foreign public debt (44.9 percent), announced that it was also going to deliver 
$20 million in interim debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) over 
FY2007 - FY2008.
11   
                                                 
10 IMF (2007b), “Haiti: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,” Country Report No. 07/292, August 2007: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07292.pdf]. 
11 IDB (2007a), “IDB Governors approve $4.4 billion in debt relief for Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and 
Nicaragua,” Press Release, March 16, 2007: 
[http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?artid=3665&language=En]. Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 6 
  
How much debt relief will Haiti obtain once it 
reaches completion point? 
Once  Haiti  reaches  completion  point,  the  country  will  receive  $212.9  million  in  debt 
cancellation over time from both multilateral ($110.9 million) and bilateral ($102.0 million) 
creditors under the HIPC Initiative.
12   
 
Furthermore, reaching completion point will trigger additional debt cancellation under the 
MDRI, which will signify a more important reduction in debt for Haiti.  From the World 
Bank, Haiti could receive $464.4 million in debt cancellation.  Also, although the IDB did 
not participate in the MDRI, it has agreed to further debt cancellation and has linked the 
delivery of full debt relief of approximately $525 million in both future principal and interest 
payments  (which  includes  interim  debt  relief)  to  Haiti  reaching completion point status 
under the MDRI.
13   
 
Thus there is just over $1.2 billion of debt cancellation that is dependent on Haiti reaching 
completion point. 
 
Haiti will not obtain any debt relief from the IMF beyond the HIPC Initiative because it had 
repaid all its MDRI-eligible debt to the IMF when it reached decision point status. However, 
Haiti’s debt to the Fund after HIPC debt relief and after some recent repurchases will be 
relatively low. 
 
When can we expect Haiti to reach completion 
point?  
Originally, in the 2006 decision point document, the IMF and IDA expected Haiti to reach 
completion point by September of 2008.  This did not happen. In Fall 2008, Haiti’s expected 
Completion Point date was moved to “first half 2009” by the IMF and the World Bank.
14 




Furthermore, a look at other countries that have gone through, or are going through the 
same process of meeting the conditions for debt relief, paints a bleaker picture for Haiti. 
Under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, countries that have reached decision point status take 
                                                 
12 IDA/IMF (2006), Decision Point Document, p. 22. 
13 IDB (2007a), op. cit. and IDB (2007b), “Haiti: Strengthening Public Resource Management,” Grant Proposal 
(HA-L1017): [http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1117262]. 
14 See World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2008). “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI)—Status of Implementation”, September 12, 2008, 
p.57. [http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/091208.pdf]. 
15 IMF (2008b), “Haiti: Third Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility,” IMF Country Report No. 08/223, p.13: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08223.pdf]. Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 7 
 
 
three years, on average, to reach completion point.
16 Of the 22 countries that have reached 
completion point, 18 have taken more than two years and only one has reached completion 
point in one year or less, after having reached decision point status.  Of the nine additional 
countries (Haiti included) that have reached decision point status and that are now struggling 
to meet the conditions required for completion point, five started more than four years ago.  
 
The IDA and IMF pointed out in the decision point document that Haiti would forgo an 
estimated $18.6 million in debt relief in the event of a one-year delay in reaching completion 
point.
17 This foregone debt relief (i.e. what Haiti would not pay in debt service for FY2009) 
does not include, however, foregone debt relief from bilateral creditors and from other 
multilateral creditors, in particular the IDB. 
 
Based on the debt service schedules for the IDB loans that are up for cancellation (i.e., the 
outstanding loan balance as of December 31, 2004), Haiti will have to pay $25.9 million in 
debt  service  for  FY2009  (October  2008-September  2009)  on  those  loans,  since  the 
completion point was not reached by September 2008. This amount refers only to those loans 
that will be canceled once the country reaches completion point.  Therefore, it does not 
include additional debt service payments for outstanding loan balances after the cutoff date 
of December 31, 2004.  According to the latest IDB debt service projections for Haiti 
(September 30, 2008), these additional payments would amount to $12.3 million for FY2009. 
 
This brings the total debt service at risk to $44.5 million; and this does not include bilateral 
debt service of $11.4 million, at least some of which would presumably be canceled along 
with  the  rest. This is a considerable amount of money for a country with such limited 
resources as Haiti. Taking just the $44 million and ignoring the bilateral debt service, that is 
about 26 percent of the government's spending on public health, in a country with severe 
public health problems and that is recovering from recent devastating natural disasters. 
 
As noted above, completion point is now expected to be reached at some time during the 
first half of 2009. This would imply that Haiti would be foregoing an average of $3.7 million 
in  debt  relief  every  month  between  September  2008  and  the  date  completion  point  is 
reached.  However, it seems that the IDB plans on covering a significant portion of Haiti’s 
debt service payments to that institution for the first half of 2009.  This would certainly 
reduce the amount of foregone debt relief, but would not eliminate it completely, since the 
country would still have to make its debt service payments to other multilateral and bilateral 
debt holders. 
 
In the next section, specific conditions for debt relief are discussed, together with dates 
when these conditions are expected to be met and factors that could cause potential further 





                                                 
16 Based on the average for 22 HIPC completion point countries as listed on Table 4 (p. 76) of IDA/IMF 
(2007). 
17 IDA/IMF (2006), p. 23. Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 8 
Conditions for debt relief 
A full list of the conditions or ‘trigger points’ that will enable Haiti to reach completion point 
status are included in the Appendix and are taken from Box 2 (p. 27) in IMF/IDA (2006).  
Below, some of the conditions are discussed. 
 
Preparation of a full Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
 
The completion of a full PRSP was expected to occur at the end of September 2007 and the 
Haitian authorities had been eager to finalize this document, since as stated above, they still 
have to implement the recommended actions for one full year before fulfilling this condition 
for debt relief.  
  
In its July 2007 report on Haiti, the IMF mentions the Haitian authorities’ eagerness to 
finalize the PRSP as soon as possible, but the Fund warned not to sacrifice “the document’s 
quality and its broad participatory process.”
18 
 
Haiti, however, had already started the PRSP process in 2003. This came to a halt with the 
overthrow  of  the  elected  government  in  2004  and  was  re-started  by  the  transitional 
government in 2005, finally resulting in an Interim PRSP document, published in September 
2006.
19   
 
The final, full PRSP was submitted to the World Bank and IMF by the Haitian government 
on November 30, 2007.
20  According to the latest IMF document, the implementation of the 
document’s recommendations is ‘underway’ and this condition is expected to be met during 
the first half of 2009.
21   
 
Macroeconomic Stability: Maintenance of macroeconomic stability as evidenced by 
satisfactory performance under the PRGF-supported program. 
 
In November 2006, after reaching decision-point status, Haiti signed a three-year Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) agreement with the IMF.  The main objective of the 
program was for Haiti to achieve sustained economic growth to reduce poverty and improve 
living standards.  An annual growth rate of 4 percent in real GDP was set as a modest target 
for the three years of the program. 
 
Another important goal was to achieve higher economic growth as mentioned above, but 
under a stable macroeconomic environment that focused on lower inflation and a higher 
level of international reserves.  The target for consumer price inflation was a decline to an 
                                                 
18 IMF 2007a, “Haiti: 2007 Article IV Consultation, First Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility”, IMF Country Report No. 07/293, p.17: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07293.pdf]. 
19 The final Interim PRSP can be found on the IMF’s website at: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06411.pdf]. 
20 The English translation of the original document is available through the World Bank and IMF websites (e.g. 
through the IMF’s website at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08115.pdf) and the original 
in French through Haiti’s Planning and External Cooperation Ministry: http://www.mpce.gouv.ht/dsrp.htm. 
21 See IMF (2008b), p. 26, cited above. Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 9 
 
 
annual rate of around 6 percent by 2009.  Gross international reserves were set to increase to 
around $600 million by the end of 2009 for a coverage of 2.5 months of imports.  However, 
for the purposes of monitoring progress in the accumulation of reserves, a definition of net 
international reserves that excludes commercial banks’ foreign currency deposits at Haiti’s 
central bank (BRH) is being used.
22 
 
In the first year of the PRGF program, inflation declined substantially from 12.4 percent 
(year-over-year) in September 2006 to 7.9 percent in September 2007, below a target rate of 
9 percent for the end of Haiti’s 2007 fiscal year.
23  This seems to have been the result of 
excessively tight fiscal and monetary policy.  In fact, in the second review of the PRGF 
program’s performance indicators for September 2007, the IMF recommended the Haitian 
government to increase public investment and loosen monetary policy:  
 
“In the short term, the key priority is to step up the slow pace of budget execution, 
particularly in domestically financed investment, without compromising expenditure 
quality. In addition, the central bank should fully use the available room for base 
money  growth  under  the  indicative  program  targets,  to  avoid  an  overly  tight 
monetary stance.”24  
  
International reserves also increased beyond target in the first year of the PRGF program, 
from around $125.5 million in September 2006 to $259 million in September 2007, $30 
million above target. 
 
But the Haitian government may have improved macroeconomic stability at the expense of 
growth.  At  the  time  of  the  second  review,  the  IMF  seems  to  have  recognized  this  by 
lowering its GDP growth forecast for 2007 from 4.0 to 3.5 percent.  The latest official 
figures put Haiti’s annual real GDP growth rate for 2007 at 3.2 percent, lower than the 
PRGF’s goal of achieving a 4 percent annual growth rate.  An overly tight monetary policy 
may have also caused the gourde to appreciate, thus reducing growth and employment by 
reducing exports and making imports artificially cheap. 
 
It should be kept in mind that growth and employment are the macroeconomic variables 
that most contribute to poverty reduction; and an overemphasis on reducing inflation and 
limiting government spending, without regard to economic growth, can reduce growth and 
employment  below  their  potential.    Unfortunately,  like  in  many  other  poor  countries, 
employment indicators are not readily available to evaluate any progress or deterioration in 
the labor market since the beginning of the PRGF program. 
 
Since August 2007, inflation started to reverse its declining trend, led by increases in food 
prices which account for 50 percent of Haiti’s consumer price index basket.
25  Hurricane 
Dean and tropical storm Noel hit Haiti in August and October and were responsible, in part, 
for increasing inflation in food prices in late 2007, due to the significant loss of agricultural 
                                                 
22 For a summary of the main targets for the program, see table on p.7 of IMF (2006), “Haiti: Request for a 
Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility—Staff Report,” IMF Country 
Report No. 06/441: [http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06441.pdf]. 
23 Recall that the fiscal year in Haiti runs from October to September. 
24 IMF (2007a, p. 4). 
25 The food component’s share of Haiti’s CPI basket is the second highest in the Western Hemisphere, after St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines (See Box 1, p. 5 in IMF (2008b), cited above).  Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 10 
output.  Sharp increases in international oil and food prices have also had a great impact on 
inflation in Haiti and on the country’s trade deficit since Haiti is a significant net importer of 
these products. 
 
Since August 2007, when the monthly (year-over-year) inflation rate reached its lowest point 
in 8 years (7.6 percent), consumer price inflation had increased to 18.8 percent by August 
2008.  Food price inflation in that same month, however, was increasing at a 25.5 percent 
rate (18.2 percent for domestic food products and 33.7 percent for imported food products).  
The  housing,  energy  and  water  component  of  the  price  index  was  increasing  at  a  13.1 
percent rate in August 2008, but the imported component of this subcategory (which largely 
reflects the costs of imported oil) was increasing at a 33.4 percent rate.  Core inflation, which 
excludes food, fuel and public transportation, has been stable at around 10-11 percent since 
September 2007.
26      
 
These sharp increases in food and energy prices have created a major humanitarian crisis in 
Haiti, with massive starvation among the poorest sectors that has even led some Haitians to 
eat mud cakes in order to survive.
27 Riots erupted in response to sharp increases in the cost 
of living and resulted in the dismissal of Haitian Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis on 
April  12,  2008.    After  the  rejection  by  Haitian  legislators  of  two  of  President  Préval’s 
nominees to replace the post, Michèle Pierre-Louis was ratified as the country’s new Prime 
Minister on July 31, 2008.
28 
 
Haiti can also expect to be severely and negatively affected by the recent downtown in the 
U.S. economy. Haiti’s exports to the U.S. are an important part of its economy, equivalent to 
8.6 percent of its GDP in 2007. The recent downturn in the U.S. economy, led by the 
collapse of a massive housing bubble, has led to a decline in consumer spending, and a 
shrinking of the U.S. import market as U.S. goods and services become more competitive 
with overseas imports. While the length and depth of the recession are difficult to forecast, it 
is  clearly  just  beginning, as only about sixty percent of U.S. housing bubble wealth has 
deflated,  and  U.S.  imports  are  likely  to  decline  further.  Unless  counteracted  by  policy 
changes, these changes will likely have a negative impact on Haiti’s economic growth.
29 Haiti 
is also heavily dependent on remittances from abroad, especially from the United States, 
with  some  estimates  of  Haiti’s  remittances  as  high  as  28  percent  of  GDP.
30    These 
remittances will decline and can also have a significant negative impact. 
 
In light of these events, it seems that the macroeconomic stability envisioned in the PRGF 
program might not be attained if the Haitian government is to have enough policy space and 
                                                 
26 Prix à la consommation, Aout 2008: [http://www.ihsi.ht/produit_economie_ind_con_ipc_quid.htm].  
27 See, for example, Rory Carroll, “Haiti: Mud cakes become staple diet as cost of food soars beyond a family's 
reach”, The Guardian, July 29, 2008: 
[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/29/food.internationalaidanddevelopment]. 
28 See, for example, “Haiti Approves New Premier After Standoff”, The Associated Press, August 1, 2008. 
Available online through the New York Times website: 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/americas/01haiti.html?ref=Americas]. 
29 See Mark Weisbrot, John Schmitt, and Luis Sandoval, “The Economic Impact of a U.S. Slowdown on the 
Americas.” Center for Economic and Policy Research, March 2008. 
[http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/recession_americas_2008_02.pdf] 
30 The Multilateral Investment Fund (2007). “Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean 2007 
(US$ millions)”. [http://www.iadb.org/mif/remesas_map.cfm?language=English&parid=5&item1d=2]. Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 11 
 
 
resources to respond to the crisis and mitigate its effects.  The recent spike in inflation is due 
to exogenous supply-side factors and therefore, should not be addressed through an over- 
tightening  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policy.    The  Haitian  government  should  perhaps 
concentrate instead, as it has started to do, on using its domestic resources and the promised 
emergency aid by the international community to ensure a stable supply of food to the most 
vulnerable sectors of Haitian society (e.g. through imports and subsidies) and to continue 
focusing on labor-intensive public investment projects in order to sustain employment.
31    
 
The  IMF  has  recognized  the  difficulties  in  meeting  macroeconomic  targets  set  for 
September  2008,  ahead  of  the  fourth  review  of  the  PRGF  program,  and  has therefore 
modified them.  With these modifications, there is more room for increases in the money 
supply, especially given the inflow of aid money that would have to be sterilized by the 
central  bank  in  order  to  meet  tighter  base  money  growth  targets,  and  a lower pace of 
international  reserves  accumulation.    In  fact,  the  modified  target  for  net  international 
reserves  for  September  2008  is  $14  million  lower  than  the  actual  level  of  reserves  in 
September 2007 (i.e. the target is now a level of $245 million, while the actual level as of July 
3, 2008, according to the BRH, is $264 million). 
 
Adoption and satisfactory implementation of a new public procurement law, in line 
with international best practice. Compliance by all Government purchasing agencies 
evidenced  by  independent audit of contracts above $1m equivalent and also of a 
representative random sample of all other Government contracts, awarded during the 
6 months preceding the audit 
 
The adoption and implementation of a new public procurement law is another requirement 
for Haiti to attain completion point status and hence, debt relief.  It also represents another 
factor  that  caused  delays  in  attaining  such  status  beyond  the  original  September  2008 
deadline and could possibly cause further delays beyond the new deadline of ‘sometime’ in 
the first half of 2009. 
 
There is a draft of the proposed law ready to be submitted to the Haitian parliament, but 
approval of the law was delayed due to the dismissal of Prime Minister Alexis. The process 
of appointing a new prime minister then delayed elections for a third of the Senate.
32 With 
the final approval of Michèle Pierre-Louis as the new prime minister, the process of electing 
senators and of passing the procurement law can now be resumed. However, according to 
the IMF, after the draft of the law is submitted to both chambers of Parliament, it will take 
around 3 months for the law to be approved and another 8 months to carry out the audits 
that would satisfy this trigger point for attaining completion point status.
33 
 
                                                 
31 For an early estimate of the pledged aid by various donors, see Annex 1, p. 14 in World Bank (2008), “Food 
Price Crisis Response Trust Fund. Supplemental Financing Document for a Proposed Supplemental Financing 
in the Amount of US$10 million to the Republic of Haiti”, World Bank Report No. 43731-HT: [http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/05/26/000333038_200805260144
54/Rendered/PDF/437310PJPR0P1117379B01OFF0USE0ONLY1.pdf]. 
32 See, for example, “Haiti PM faces task of building new govt.”, The Associated Press, August 5, 2008. Available 
online through USA Today: [http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-08-05-Haiti_N.htm]. 
33 See IMF (2008b), cited above, Table 10, p. 26. Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 12 
It seems that the draft law has not yet been submitted to or discussed by Parliament, but the 
required audits might already be underway in anticipation of the law’s approval.  This means 
that Haiti could potentially fulfill this condition by June 2009. 
 
Things to watch for in the coming months  
The fourth review of the PRGF program will evaluate whether the targets set for September 
2008 where met or not and will probably be finalized and released by the IMF in January 
2009.    In  that  document,  we  can  expect  new  information  to  assess  Haiti’s  progress  in 
fulfilling the HIPC Completion Point Triggers, particularly regarding the IMF’s evaluation of 
the country’s performance under the PRGF program, the adoption and implementation of 
the new government procurement law, progress in attaining the primary school enrollment 
objectives and the status of the PRSP implementation process. 
 
Conclusion 
It is thus clear that immediate cancellation of Haiti’s debt would provide desperately needed 
resources to the most impoverished country in the hemisphere. Advocacy groups have also 
argued that it is unfair that Haiti should have to wait and fulfill other conditions while the 
other Latin American HIPC countries have already received their debt cancellation from the 
multi-lateral lenders. This is the result of a technicality that Haiti was not included among the 
original HIPC countries. The fact that this was a mistake was implicitly acknowledged by the 
addition of Haiti to the HIPC Initiative in the year 2006.  
 
There is also little reason to believe that the conditions set by the IMF and World Bank for 
further debt cancellation are likely to benefit Haiti. Although the experience of HIPC debt 
cancellation is positive with regard to the funds freed up from debt cancellation being used 
for poverty-reducing expenditures,
34 the conditions attached to this debt cancellation do not 
have a positive track record. For example, in April 2007 the IMF's Independent Evaluation 
Office released a report that examined the experience of 29 Sub-Saharan African countries 
that underwent PRGF programs, and were therefore subject to IMF conditions, from 1999-
2005. The report was highly critical of the IMF's role, and among other findings noted that 
nearly three-quarters of the aid money reaching these countries was not spent. Rather, at the 
IMF's urging, this money was used to pay off debt and to add to reserves. 
35 
 
Another reason that these institutions should grant immediate debt cancellation is that they 
contributed to enormous economic damage in Haiti by cutting off all disbursements from 
2001– 2004. There is considerable evidence that this cut off of aid was part of a deliberate 
effort by the U.S. government to destabilize and ultimately topple the elected government of 
Haiti.
36 As noted by economist Jeffrey Sachs, a former advisor to the IMF and World Bank, 
                                                 
34 See IDA/IMF (2007), "Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) – Status of Implementation" August 28,2007 
[http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/082807.pdf].   
35 See Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF (2007), “The IMF and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.” Online at: 
[http://www.imf.org/External/NP/ieo/2007/ssa/eng/pdf/report.pdf].  
36 Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. “RFK Memorial Takes Treasury Department to 
Court to Determine US Role in Denying Loans Vital to Haiti’s Perilous Public Health.” Press Release, August Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 13 
 
 
“U.S. officials surely knew that the aid embargo would mean a balance-of-payments crisis, a 




For a country as poor as Haiti, the aid embargo was enormously destructive to the economy, 
and the violence during and after the coup inflicted further damage and cost thousands of 
lives. Because of their participation in this effort, the multilateral institutions should at the 
very least cancel Haiti’s debt as rapidly as possible.  
 
Funds made available through debt cancellation would also give Haiti the opportunity to 
address urgent humanitarian needs in the wake of recent natural disasters. In the summer of 
2008,  Haiti  was  hit  by  a  series  of  successive  hurricanes,  with  disastrous  consequences, 
resulting in an estimated 800 deaths total, according to the UN, and leaving over a million – 
or one-ninth - of Haiti’s population homeless, according to Prime Minister Michèle Pierre-
Louis.  
 
Tropical Storm Fay hit first, damaging crops and killing up to ten people. Hurricane Gustav 
then hit Haiti at the end of August, resulting in 76 deaths, 2,100 houses destroyed and 8,150 
more homes damaged, affecting tens of thousands of people, some of whom were forced to 
live in temporary shelters.
38 Just days later Hurricane Hanna struck, with far more severe 
consequences. The city of Gonaïves was flooded, forcing people to their rooftops to await 
rescue that in some cases never arrived. Hundreds were killed, and tens of thousands were 
forced to go to shelters, with 30,000 still in shelters by the end of October.
39 In Les Cayes, a 
hospital had to be evacuated after being flooded, and at least 5,000 people were moved to 
public shelters due to the flooding.
40 Hurricane Ike was last to hit, killing some 74 more,
 41 
sweeping away the coastal community of Cabaret, and wiping out the last bridge left in 




United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes declared 
the storms to be “worst disaster in the last 100 years” to hit Haiti, saying that only 40 per 
cent of the $107 million flash appeal aimed at assisting the emergency relief effort had been 
pledged as of October 27, 2008.
43 World Bank President Robert Zoellick recognized the 
extent of the destruction left in the wake of the storms when he traveled to Haiti in October 
                                                                                                                                            
15, 2006. Found at http://www.rfkmemorial.org/legacyinaction/2002_TreasCompl/. See Walt Bogdanich and 
Jenny Nordberg, “Mixed U.S. Signals Helped Tilt Haiti Toward Chaos.” The New York Times, January 29, 2006, 
for background on the U.S. role in the coup.  
37 Jeffrey Sachs, “From His First Day in Office, Bush Was Ousting Aristide,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2004 
38 International Organization for Migration, "IOM aids hurricane Gustav victims in Haiti". September 2, 2008. 
[http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pbnAM/cache/offonce?entryId=18509] 
39 UN News Center, “Appeal for hurricane relief in Haiti badly under-funded, UN aid chief says.” October 27, 
2008 
40 Jonathan Katz, “Flooding overwhelms hungry Haitians.” Associated Press, September 3, 2008. 
[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26531599/wid/17621070] 
41 Associated Press, “Ike hits old Havana; overall death toll up to 80.” September 9, 2008. 
[http://www.aztvonline.com/global/story.asp?s=8978906&ClientType=Printable] 
42 Associated Press, “Ike's floods kill 48, cut off aid to parts of Haiti.” September 8, 2008. 
[http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/weather/09/07/ike.haiti.ap/index.html] 
43 UN News Center, “Appeal for hurricane relief in Haiti badly under-funded, UN aid chief says.” October 27, 2008. 
[http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28729&Cr=haiti&Cr1=hurricane] Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 14 
2008. Zoellick estimated the damage at nearly $1 billion, and said “That's a lot for a country 
of 8 million people and there's been a terrible loss of lives.”
44 Nevertheless, in answers to 
reporters’ inquiries, Zoellick stated that the World Bank would not expedite Haiti’s debt 
cancellation outside of the HIPC process.
45 
 
These storms follow a similarly destructive season last year, when over 57 people died, over 
700  homes  were  destroyed  -- more than 4,000 seriously damaged -- and “around 4,000 
families [were left] in distress and 3,000 persons living in temporary shelters," according to 
the International Organization for Migration.
46 So poor is infrastructure and capacity for 
reconstruction in Haiti that the country is still feeling the effects of Hurricane Jeanne in 
2004,  which  resulted  in  over  3,000  deaths.
47  Haiti’s  geographic  vulnerability  to  tropical 
storms, and its poor capacity to cope with their after-effects, underscores the urgent need for 
debt  relief.  Debt  cancellation  would  also  present  the  Haitian  government  with  the 
opportunity  to  implement  disaster  preparedness  measures  that  might  help  mitigate  the 
impact of such storms in the future. 
 
                                                 
44 Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haiti storm damage estimated at $1 billion.” Reuters, October 22, 
2008.[http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N22404091.htm] 
45 Jonathan Katz, “World Bank: Storm-Struck Haiti at 'Tipping Point'.” Associated Press,  
October 23, 2008. [http://www.aol.com.au/news/story/World-Bank-president-in-Haiti-after-killer-
storms/1173211/index.html]  
46 International Organization for Migration, “Haiti: Assistance to flood victims.” Press release, October 16, 
2007. Found at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-782D7W?OpenDocument 
47 USAID. “Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2004, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.” Found at 
[http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual_reports/
pdf/AR2004.pdf]. Center for Economic and Policy Research, December 2008 • 15 
 
 
Appendix: Conditions for Debt Relief48 
1.  PRSP:  Preparation  of  a  full  PRSP  through  a  participatory  process  and  satisfactory 
implementation of its recommended actions for at least one year, as evidenced by an Annual 
Progress Report submitted by the Government to satisfaction of IDA and the IMF. 
 
2.  Macroeconomic  Stability:  Maintenance  of  macroeconomic  stability  as  evidenced  by 
satisfactory performance under the PRGF-supported program. 
 
3.  Public  Finance  Management  and  Governance:  (a)  Adoption  of  an  automated 
mechanism  to  track  public  expenditures  for  poverty  reduction  on  the  basis  of  existing 
expenditure classification, publication of quarterly reports on these expenditures executed 
over a period of at least six months preceding completion point; (b) Alignment of public 
spending priorities with the I-PRSP, and, when completed, the PRSP, reflecting emphasis on 
pro-poor growth; (c) Up-to-date preparation of Government accounts by the MEF [Ministère 
de l’Economie et des Finances de la Republique d’Haïti] and their annual audit by the CSCCA [Cours 
Superieure  des  Comptes  et  du  Contentieux  Administratifs  –  the  “Supreme  Audit  Institution”], 
submission  to  Parliament  and  publication  of  audited  Government  accounts  following 
generally  accepted  audit  standards  and  legally  mandated  timetable;  (d)  Adoption  and 
satisfactory implementation of a new public procurement law, in line with international best 
practice.  Compliance  by  all  Government  purchasing  agencies  evidenced  by  independent 
audit of contracts above $1m equivalent and also of a representative random sample of all 
other  Government  contracts,  awarded  during  the  6  months  preceding  the  audit;  (e) 
Adoption  of  a  law  on  asset  declaration  and  submission  to  the  CSCCA  and  to  the 
Parliamentary  ethics  and  anticorruption  commissions  of  at  least  one  annual  compliance 
report on the monitoring of the asset declarations covering the preceding year.  
 
4. Structural Reforms: Strengthen tax administration and policy by: (a) reinforcing and 
establishing customs control in Cap Haïtien, Gonaives, Saint Marc, Miragoane, Malpasse, 
Ouanaminthe  and  Belladere,  including  by  installing  ASYCUDA  [Automated  System  for 
Customs Data]; (b) extending use of the central taxpayer file to all taxpayers in the Port-au-
Prince metropolitan zone and registering in it all the taxpayers identified in the tax centers of 
Cayes, Miragoane, Saint Marc, Port de Paix, Cap Haïtien and Fort Liberté. 
 
5. Social sectors: Education (a) Adoption and satisfactory implementation of a public 
financing mechanism to help poor families pay for costs of school fees in non-public schools 
to allow enrollment of an additional 50,000 out-of-school children in primary school as 
evidenced by the results of an independent audit of schools receiving public transfers; (b) 
Actual recurrent expenditures for education reach at least 21 percent of actual total recurrent 
Government spending, of which at least 50 percent is spent on primary education, over the 
12 months preceding completion point, enabling inter alia the training of 2,500 new primary 
teachers (at least 1 year) and on average two visits per year of all primary schools by MENJS 
[Ministère de L’Education Nationale de la. Jeunesse et des Sports] inspectors.  
 
                                                 
48 IDA/IMF 2006, “Haiti: Enhanced Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries—Decision Point 
Document,” IMF Country Report No. 06/440, November 2006: 
[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06440.pdf] Update - Debt Cancellation for Haiti: No Reason for Delays • 16 
On this front, the World Bank has approved a three-phase loan project (with $25 million per 
phase and each phase lasting for three years) that will aim in the first phase (2007-2010) to 
“ensure educational access for 100,000 poor children aged 6-12 who are currently out of 
school (20% of the estimated 500,000 children not in school)” (EFA [Education For All], 
Project Information Document, Concept Stage).  This will be done mainly through subsidies 
for poor families to send their children to “non-public” schools. 
 
6. Health and HIV/AIDS: Increase by at least 10 percentage points immunization rates for 
DPT3, BCG and measles; approval by the Government of National Policy, Strategic Plan 
and Scale up Operational Plan for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. 
 
7. Debt management: (a) Centralization of all information on public external and domestic 
foreign currency debt in a single database; (b) publication of two consecutive up-to-date 
quarterly  reports  on  external  debt  data  with  a  maximum  3  month  lag  in  the  period 
immediately before the completion point. 